On January 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order declaring a national emergency tied to the actions of the Cuban government, with the measure taking effect in the early hours of January 30. The order asserts that Cuba’s communist leadership represents an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, a designation that unlocks broad presidential authority under emergency economic powers statutes. At its core, the order establishes a mechanism that could allow Washington to impose new tariffs on goods imported from countries that supply oil or petroleum products to Cuba, targeting the island’s most critical economic lifeline at a moment of deep internal crisis.
This escalation cannot be understood without the long and adversarial history between Washington and Havana. Relations deteriorated sharply after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when Fidel Castro’s government nationalized U.S.-owned property and aligned itself with the Soviet Union. In response, the United States imposed a sweeping economic embargo in the early 1960s, a policy that endured across Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Although the Cold War ended decades ago, the embargo remained a defining feature of bilateral relations, reinforced by human rights concerns, Cuba’s one-party political system, and its alignment with U.S. adversaries.
There were moments when this rigid posture appeared to soften. Between 2014 and 2016, the Obama administration pursued a policy of engagement, restoring diplomatic relations and easing restrictions on travel and commerce. That opening was short-lived. During Trump’s first term, many of those measures were reversed, with the administration citing Cuba’s domestic repression and its support for Nicolás Maduro’s government in Venezuela. When Trump returned to office in January 2025, his team signaled early that the era of engagement was over, replaced by a strategy of maximum pressure designed to force concessions or destabilize the regime.
Key figures in the administration have been central to shaping this approach. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American lawmaker with long-standing ties to the exile community in Florida, has consistently argued that economic pain is the only language Havana understands. Rubio and others have linked Cuba’s fate to developments in Venezuela, long its principal benefactor. In early January 2026, a U.S.-backed operation led to the capture of former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, disrupting the oil-for-services arrangement that had sustained Cuba for years. That shock intensified the island’s already severe energy crisis and sharpened Washington’s sense that Cuba was uniquely vulnerable.
By the mid-2020s, Cuba’s economy was in free fall. The combined effects of the U.S. embargo, declining productivity, mismanagement, and the collapse of tourism during the COVID-19 pandemic left the government struggling to meet basic needs. Fuel shortages became chronic, leading to rolling blackouts that in some areas lasted more than twenty hours a day. Agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing suffered, and hospitals and water systems faced intermittent failures. Public frustration boiled over into rare mass protests in 2021, and emigration surged, with hundreds of thousands of Cubans attempting to reach the United States between 2022 and 2024.
Energy imports sit at the center of this crisis. For years, Cuba relied on heavily subsidized Venezuelan oil, receiving as much as 100,000 barrels per day at the height of the partnership. In exchange, Cuba sent doctors, teachers, and security personnel to Venezuela. As Venezuela’s own production collapsed under sanctions and mismanagement, those shipments dwindled to a fraction of their former levels. By late 2025, Cuba was receiving only around 30,000 barrels per day from Caracas, forcing it to scramble for alternative suppliers.
Russia stepped in intermittently, sending small and irregular shipments, but these volumes were insufficient to stabilize Cuba’s grid. Other countries, such as Algeria, contributed marginally. By 2025, Mexico emerged as the most significant remaining supplier, accounting for roughly forty percent of Cuba’s oil imports. Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Pemex, shipped crude and refined products often described as humanitarian in nature, sometimes at discounted rates. These shipments reflected ideological solidarity from left-leaning governments and a desire to prevent humanitarian collapse on the island.
It is this supply chain that Trump’s executive order seeks to disrupt. Invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act, the order accuses Cuba of aligning itself with hostile powers, including Russia, China, and Iran, and of hosting foreign intelligence facilities that threaten U.S. security. It also alleges that Havana contributes to regional instability through migration pressures and malign influence. These findings provide the legal justification for potential economic retaliation against third countries that enable Cuba’s access to oil.
The mechanism outlined in the order is deliberately indirect. Because Cuba itself is already largely cut off from U.S. trade, the administration has opted for a secondary sanctions model. Under this framework, the Secretary of Commerce is tasked with identifying countries that supply oil to Cuba. The Secretary of State, working with other agencies, evaluates whether those transactions pose a threat to U.S. interests and recommends tariff measures. The president then decides whether to impose additional ad valorem duties on imports from those countries, as well as the scope and duration of such penalties.
Crucially, the order does not impose tariffs immediately. Instead, it creates a legal and administrative pathway for future action, allowing the White House to calibrate pressure or use the threat of tariffs as leverage in negotiations. Administration officials have framed the policy as a means of protecting U.S. security while encouraging Cuba to realign its foreign policy and domestic practices. The order explicitly allows for modification or termination if circumstances change, signaling that it is both a punitive and bargaining tool.
Mexico has emerged as the most prominent potential target. President Claudia Sheinbaum sharply criticized the order, warning that cutting off fuel shipments could trigger a humanitarian disaster in Cuba, with cascading effects on health care, food distribution, and electricity. She emphasized that Mexico’s actions were sovereign decisions driven by humanitarian considerations, not hostility toward the United States. In the days following the order, reports indicated that some shipments were temporarily paused as Mexican officials weighed the risk of U.S. retaliation and sought diplomatic alternatives.
Russia could also face secondary effects, though its limited trade with the United States and smaller shipment volumes reduce Washington’s leverage. Other minor suppliers are considered less likely targets, either because of their minimal involvement or limited economic exposure. For Cuba itself, the implications are severe. Analysts warn that further reductions in fuel could deepen blackouts, cripple transportation, and inflame public anger, potentially leading to renewed protests or increased migration.
Reactions within the United States have been polarized. Hardline lawmakers, particularly Cuban-American representatives, praised the move as a long-overdue strike at the regime’s weakest point. Supporters argue that the policy aligns with broader efforts to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. Critics, however, contend that the strategy will primarily hurt ordinary Cubans while entrenching the government’s narrative of foreign aggression.
Internationally, left-wing parties and solidarity organizations denounced the order as an escalation of a decades-long blockade that has failed to produce democratic change. Some analysts framed it as part of a broader assertion of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere, echoing Cold War-era doctrines. Trade lawyers and business groups, meanwhile, urged companies to monitor developments closely, noting that the order’s real impact depends on future designations and enforcement decisions.
In the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, the executive order exemplifies Trump’s “America First” approach, which treats tariffs as tools of national security as much as trade. It mirrors earlier secondary sanctions imposed on buyers of Iranian and Venezuelan oil and signals a willingness to pressure even close partners in pursuit of strategic goals. Whether this approach will succeed in altering Cuba’s behavior remains uncertain. What is clear is that the order marks a significant escalation, one that could reshape regional dynamics, strain alliances, and intensify the humanitarian and political crisis on the island in the months ahead.
