The Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear an appeal from John Nassif, a Florida man convicted for his role in the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. By denying certiorari, the justices left in place lower court rulings that upheld Nassif’s conviction under a federal statute prohibiting “parading, picketing, and demonstrating” inside the Capitol building. The court’s refusal to take up the case does not constitute an endorsement of the lower courts’ reasoning, but it effectively affirms the outcome and preserves the government’s authority to continue prosecuting similar cases under the same law. Nassif had argued that the statute, as applied to his conduct, violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and peaceful assembly. His petition asked the high court to resolve what he described as a constitutional conflict over whether the Capitol’s interior spaces should be treated as public forums where expressive activity receives heightened protection. The justices’ decision to pass on the case leaves intact the prevailing interpretation adopted by the federal appellate court overseeing Washington, D.C., and ensures that the “parading” charge—one of the most common misdemeanor counts arising from January 6—remains legally viable.

Nassif, 57, was sentenced to seven months in prison after being convicted of multiple misdemeanor offenses, including disorderly conduct and violent entry. Federal prosecutors had initially recommended a sentence ranging from 10 to 16 months, citing the seriousness of the events that disrupted Congress’s certification of the 2020 presidential election. According to court records, Nassif entered the Capitol after it had already been breached and remained inside for less than 10 minutes. His public defenders argued that his actions were limited in scope and did not involve physical violence or property destruction. They described his conduct as “core First Amendment expression,” asserting that he engaged in peaceful protest rather than criminal activity. Nonetheless, jurors concluded that his unauthorized presence inside the building, amid a large-scale breach that forced lawmakers into lockdown, met the statutory requirements for the charged offenses. The sentencing court weighed mitigating and aggravating factors, including the broader context of the riot, the need for deterrence, and Nassif’s personal history. Although his prison term was shorter than what prosecutors sought, it reflected the judiciary’s consistent approach of imposing custodial sentences in cases involving unlawful entry into the Capitol during the disruption.

Lower courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, rejected Nassif’s constitutional arguments. In a decision issued by a three-judge panel, the court held that the interior of the Capitol is not a public forum generally open to protest activity. Under First Amendment doctrine, government property is categorized into traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums, with varying levels of permissible speech regulation. The D.C. Circuit determined that the Capitol buildings fall within the nonpublic forum category, meaning the government may impose reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions to maintain order and security. “Nassif has not established that the Capitol buildings are, by policy or practice, generally open for use by members of the public to voice whatever concerns they may have — much less to use for protests, pickets, or demonstrations,” the panel wrote. This reasoning rests on longstanding precedent recognizing the government’s authority to regulate access to sensitive facilities, particularly those housing critical governmental functions. The panel emphasized that Congress’s need to conduct its legislative duties without disruption justifies restrictions that might not be permissible in parks or sidewalks traditionally associated with public expression.

Nassif’s petition to the Supreme Court argued that there is a conflict between the D.C. Circuit’s approach and rulings from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals regarding the Capitol’s status as a public forum. While the federal appellate court has classified the Capitol buildings as nonpublic forums, the D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized certain areas, such as the Rotunda, as public forums in other contexts. Nassif contended that this divergence creates uncertainty about the scope of First Amendment protections inside the Capitol complex and warrants clarification from the nation’s highest court. His legal team maintained that peaceful demonstrators should not face criminal penalties merely for expressive activity in spaces historically accessible to visitors. However, U.S. District Judge John Bates previously upheld the parading charge, citing established precedents that allow reasonable restrictions on expressive conduct within government buildings dedicated to official business. The government argued that the statute serves compelling interests, including preventing interference with congressional proceedings and safeguarding the security of lawmakers, staff, and visitors. By declining review, the Supreme Court allowed the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation to stand as the controlling authority for federal prosecutions in Washington.

The impact of the court’s decision extends well beyond Nassif’s individual case. According to the Department of Justice, more than 460 defendants have been charged with the same misdemeanor offense prohibiting parading, picketing, and demonstrating in the Capitol, making it the most frequently applied charge among the more than 1,450 individuals prosecuted in connection with January 6. The Supreme Court’s refusal to intervene reinforces the government’s ability to rely on that statute in ongoing and future cases. The justices’ most recent substantive ruling involving the riot came in United States v. Fischer, in which the court narrowed the scope of the federal obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). That decision raised the burden of proof for prosecutors seeking to apply the obstruction charge to defendants accused of interfering with the certification of electoral votes. Subsequently, U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell issued a ruling in United States v. DeCarlo adopting a more demanding standard for imposing the obstruction count. Together, those rulings have complicated the Justice Department’s strategy in certain felony prosecutions. In contrast, the parading statute—now left undisturbed by the Supreme Court—remains a comparatively straightforward tool for addressing unlawful presence and protest activity inside the Capitol.

The broader legal and political landscape surrounding January 6 prosecutions continues to evolve. Nearly 600 defendants face charges of assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers, and arrests have continued even years after the event. Some of the most severe sentences have been imposed on high-profile figures such as Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio, who were convicted of seditious conspiracy and other felonies for orchestrating aspects of the riot, despite not personally engaging in violence inside the Capitol. Their cases underscore the government’s focus on leadership roles and coordinated efforts to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power. At the same time, questions linger about potential executive clemency. Former President Donald Trump has stated that he is inclined to pardon many January 6 defendants, though he has suggested that not all would qualify. The scope and timing of any such pardons remain uncertain. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassif’s case signals judicial restraint rather than sweeping constitutional change. By declining to revisit the forum status of the Capitol or the validity of the parading statute, the court has allowed the existing framework of prosecutions to proceed largely unchanged, leaving lower court precedents—and the government’s enforcement authority—firmly in place.